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Scholars, government officials, and practitioners have expressed concern
over the weaknesses of the federal rulemaking process and the time it
often takes to promulgate rules. Given the many instances in which rules
have been challenged in court, both the process of rulemaking and the
regulations produced seem to have lost legitimacy in the eyes of many
regulatees.
Since the late 1970's, advocates of negotiated approaches to rulemaking
have argued that the legitimacy of proposed rules could be restored-and
time-consuming court challenges avoided-if informal, face-to-face negoti-
ations were used to supplement the traditional review and comment pro-
cess. Critics, however, have responded quite negatively to what they per-
ceived as the dangers of "deal-making behind closed doors." Nevertheless,
proponents of the innovation have persisted, and during the last few years
several federal agencies have experimented with negotiated approaches to
rulemaking.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has undertaken the most
elaborate tests of the concept. EPA's experiences shed new light on the
advantages of negotiated rulemaking and suggest that some of the concerns
of the critics have been misplaced. This article examines the results of the
EPA demonstrations in order to test the models of negotiated rulemaking
advanced by advocates, to respond to the concerns of critics, and to inform
and improve the provisional theory. With the refinements suggested in
this article, EPA's approach to negotiated rulemaking appears to hold
great promise for remedying the crisis of regulatory legitimacy.
I. Negotiated Rulemaking as a Regulatory Reform
Almost all the parties involved in federal rulemaking-business
associations, public interest groups, and many government officials-
complain about the time and expense involved in developing and
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implementing regulations.' Businesses assert that delays are costly and
increase the uncertainty surrounding investment decisions.2 Advocacy
groups complain that litigation delays implementation of important rules.3
Each party tends to think that the agency favors the others.' Agency offi-
cials, on the other hand, feel that their autonomy has been unreasonably
limited by procedural requirements mandated by Congress and the
courts.5 Courts, however, are inappropriate as final arbitrators of techni-
cally complex regulatory disputes. Many judges fear "government by the
judiciary" and admit their inability to cope with complex technical issues.'
These groups would certainly be less troubled if they believed that the
conventional rulemaking process generated rules responsive to their inter-
ests, but few are satisfied with the time it takes to enact rules, the cost
involved, or the quality of the rules produced.' In a speech delivered
shortly before he left EPA, former Administrator William Ruckelshaus
estimated that more than 80% of EPA's rules are challenged in court and
that approximately 30% of the Agency's rules are significantly changed as
a result of litigation.'
How did this situation develop? The roots of the problem can be found
in the evolution of the regulatory process and in the changing nature of
the issues that the process has been forced to address during the past sev-
eral decades. Agency rulemaking from the New Deal to the early 1960's
was characterized by broad deference to agency expertise and discretion.
By the late 1960's, however, the groups being regulated, the newly
emergent environmental advocacy organizations, and the courts had
become unwilling to let such discretion go unchallenged.
Federal regulations typically are developed under procedures defined by
the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946." Using in-house expertise and
1. Morgan, Towards a Revised Strategy for Ratemaking, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 21, 21-22 (1978);
Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1871 (1981).
2. W. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Negotiation: A New Way of Winning, Address to the Conser-
vation Foundation's Second National Conference on Environmental Dispute Resolution 3 (Oct. 1,
1984) (on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
3. Id. at 14.
4. Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The History, Needs, and Future of a
Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393, 1404 (1984).
5. W. Ruckelshaus, supra note 2, at 2.
6. See, e.g., Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, 205 SCIENCE 277, 278 (1979); Leventhal, Environ-
mental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 541-42 (1974).
7. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L. J. 1, 6 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Cure for Malaise]; S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 592 (2nd ed. 1985).
8. W. Ruckelshaus, supra note 2, at 2. Ruckelshaus also noted the tremendous amount of time
consumed by litigation over agency rules. He estimated that, each year, handling litigation from
rulemaking challenges requires approximately 50 person-years from EPA's Office of General Coun-
sel, 75 person-years from the EPA program offices, 25 person-years from the Department of Justice,
and 175 person-years on the part of the plaintiffs' counsel. Id.
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informal individual meetings with stakeholders (parties who are interested
in or will be affected by the rule), an agency such as EPA first develops a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which is published in the Federal Regis-
ter. Non-agency stakeholders, such as businesses or environmental organi-
zations, are then able to respond by adding to a rulemaking record
through a formal public comment process. Oral hearings are permissible
but not required. The agency must base the final rulemaking on a consid-
eration of the record, although in addressing ambiguities and uncertainties
in the record it may make policy choices where necessary."
Many of the regulations promulgated over the past two decades have
involved the resolution of complex factual questions." More importantly,
they have required difficult policy decisions that, at times, have lacked an
operable political consensus."2 If all regulations had a clearly determinable
factual basis, arguments about the exercise of agency discretion would be
moot. Agencies, however, must also make policy choices in situations
where either the desired facts are not available or the available "facts" are
contested. In such situations, the agency exercises considerable discretion
as it interprets inconsistent facts, balances various and often competing
interests, and ultimately makes subjective policy choices with very real
economic and political ramifications. In this context, an agency can expect
opposition to almost every rule it develops.
Congress, the White House, and the courts have explored a variety of
strategies to forestall concerns about the exercise of agency discretion and
to increase agency accountability. However, the government's efforts to
limit discretion have increased the time and cost involved in rulemaking.
Congress has enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),' 3 the
Sunshine Act, 4 the ex parte prohibitions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 and the Freedom of Information Act." In issuing Executive Orders
9. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706
(1982)).
10. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1669 (1978) (a discussion of agency discretion in rulemaking).
11. Harter, The Political Legitimacy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. U.L.
REV. 471, 473 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Consensual Rules); Susskind & Ozawa, Mediating Public
Disputes: Obstacles and Possibilities, 41 J. SOCIAL IssuEs 151 (1985).
12. Harter, Consensual Rules, supra note 11, at 474.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1982).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982) (requires the agency to hold open meetings for most types of
proceedings).
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (1976) (prohibits ex parte contacts during formal rulemaking and
adjudication).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (requires agencies to make available to the public
agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings).
Yale Journal on Regulation
12,29117 and 12,498,"8 the White House has given the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) greatly expanded responsibility for reviewing
the probable cost-effectiveness of proposed regulations. Since 1970, the
courts have expanded judicial supervision of agencies by broadening the
rules of standing, 9 issuing more specific criteria regarding the develop-
ment and use of a factual record,2 ° expanding notice and comment
requirements, 21 and expressing a willingness to take a "hard look" at the
reasonableness of proposed regulations.2 2 These changes have produced
"hybrid rulemaking,"2 so-called because it is intermediate between the
informal notice and comment rulemaking and formal procedures which
include evidentiary hearings.2 4
While these developments have increased agency accountability, they
have not fully responded to concerns about the legitimacy of regulatory
actions. Limiting the role of non-agency participants to adversarial chal-
lenges to the rulemaking record has been an ineffective means of building
support for the policy choices that agencies have had to make. The current
rulemaking process is bound to generate dissatisfaction as long as regula-
tory agencies retain the exclusive responsibility for making the technical
judgments and political compromises needed to develop a rule. By encour-
aging and empowering regulatees to challenge agency decisionmaking in
an effort to enhance the political legitimacy of the rulemaking process,
Congress and the courts have simply increased the complexity, cost, and
time it takes to generate rules that can be implemented.
A number of scholars have suggested negotiated rulemaking as a
response to these problems of delay, increased cost, and loss of political
legitimacy. 25 In negotiated rulemaking, an agency and other parties with a
17. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). See generally Whittington & Grubb, Economic
Analysis of Regulatory Decisions: The Implications of Executive Order 12291, 9 Sci. TECH. &
HUm. VALUES 1 (1984).
18. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973) (finding a tenuous claim of injury from regulatory action sufficient to establish standing). See
generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24 (1983).
20. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974) (ordering EPA to explain scientific basis used to support promulgated standard and
respond to the industry's technical objections to standards).
21. See I K. DAVIS, supra note 19, at §§ 6:19, 6:20, 6:25, 6:26.
22. See Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976) (in review-
ing a rule phasing out lead additives in gasoline, the court took a hard look at the statement that lead
in auto emissions endangers the public health or welfare).
23. See generally Delong, Informed Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA.
L. REV. 257, 262-319 (1979).
24. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1982) (APA procedures for a formal rulemaking).
25. Stewart, supra note 10, at 1259, 1344-53; Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7; Note,
supra note 1. Congress has also examined negotiations as an alternative rulemaking process in
response to concerns about the present regulatory system. Regulatory Negotiation: Joint Hearings
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business and the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
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significant stake in a rule participate in facilitated face-to-face interactions
designed to produce a consensus. Together the parties explore their shared
interests as well as differences of opinion, collaborate in gathering and
analyzing technical information, generate options, and bargain and trade
across these options according to their differing priorities. If a consensus is
reached,26 it is published in the Federal Register as the agency's notice of
proposed rulemaking, and then the conventional review and comment pro-
cess takes over. Because most of the parties likely to comment have
already agreed on the notice of proposed rulemaking, the review period
should be uneventful. The prospects of subsequent litigation should be all
but eliminated.
Agencies other than EPA have experimented with a modified negotiated
rulemaking process. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) tried a negotiated approach to drafting a standard for occupa-
tional exposure to benzene, and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) used a negotiated approach to develop a revised rule concerning
flight and duty time for pilots.2 7 However, neither of these agencies fol-
lowed the model for negotiated rulemaking proposed by theorists, and
thus these demonstrations are inadequate to test the concept. The OSHA
effort involved only partial adherence to the suggested model-OSHA did
not participate directly, but merely invited those affected by the rule to
develop a version that they could agree upon. The OSHA effort did not
succeed.28 FAA was more successful-it adhered more closely to the
Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) 271-77
[hereinafter cited as Regulatory Negotiation Hearings]. Following these hearings, proponents of nego-
tiated rulemaking introduced The Regulatory Mediation Act of 1981, S. 1601, which sought to
"establish an alternative rulemaking procedure which includes the establishment of regulatory negoti-
ation committees."
26. In practice, consensus is achieved when all the participants remain silent in response to the
mediator's inquiry, "Is there anyone who cannot live with this latest restatement?" That moment is
usually preceded by an elaborate effort to ensure that every participant's primary concerns have been
satisfied. Such a consensus may be elusive, with the group perhaps only able to agree on a range of
acceptable alternatives. This at least narrows the scope of possibilities, and the agency can use this
product to draft a rule that falls within the acceptable boundaries. See Harter, Regulatory Negotia-
tion: The Experience So Far, RESOLVE, Winter 1984, at 9 [hereinafter cited as Harter, Experience So
Far].
27. For a detailed discussion of these demonstrations, see H. Perritt, Analysis of Four Negotiated
Rulemaking Experiments 50-118 (Sept. 4, 1985) (draft report to the Administrative Conference of the
United States).
28. There are competing views as to the reasons for OSHA's failures. One view is that OSHA's
decisions not to conduct the negotiations under FACA or to participate directly in the negotiations, as
EPA had done, minimized the chances of achieving a consensus. Another view of the OSHA negotia-
tion is that the parties simply failed to invent a creative way of reconciling their substantive differ-
ences. It is hard to point to a specific reason why this might have been the case. Perhaps the benzene
negotiation was framed too narrowly, or perhaps the parties did not consider a sufficient number of
trades or options. It may have been that the pre-existing relationship among the parties was not
conducive to a search for win-win outcomes. OSHA's difficulties have also been attributed to the
departure of a key OSHA official during the negotiations, the infrequency of negotiating sessions,
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model, but invited only a limited range of interests to participate."
Only EPA has followed all the key prescriptions of the proponents of
negotiated rulemaking-in one case to develop a proposed rule on non-
compliance penalties for heavy engine manufacturers who fail to meet the
requirements of the Clean Air Act, and in another case to redefine the
bases for granting emergency exemptions from pesticide licensing regula-
tions. 80 The results of EPA's two completed demonstrations provide the
first evidence to test the theoretical suppositions underlying the concept of
negotiated rulemaking.
II. The Prevailing Theory
In order to evaluate EPA's negotiated rulemaking demonstrations sys-
tematically, a theoretical framework is required. There are two strands of
theory that can presently be used to construct such a framework. The first
addresses the hypothetical preconditions necessary for the success of a
negotiated rulemaking, and the second sets forth criteria for evaluating
rules produced through negotiation. The two strands are interrelated, and
both draw on existing theories of negotiation and doctrines of administra-
tive process.
A. The Hypothetical Preconditions for Success
In his seminal study of negotiated rulemaking, Philip Harter proposed
a set of hypotheses about the conditions under which regulatory negotia-
tion would be likely to succeed. In developing these criteria for success,
Harter drew upon analogous situations in the broad area of dispute
resolution, in which negotiation is used to resolve complex policy
problems." The Administrative Conference of the United States endorsed
his model and adopted a set of recommendations encouraging agencies to
experiment with negotiated rulemaking.82 Eight of the criteria proposed
uncertainty about OMB's probable reaction to a rule viewed as favoring labor, and unrealistic expec-
tations on the part of some of the participants.
29. FAA's negotiated rulemaking effort began in the spring of 1983 and resulted in agreement on
a proposed rule, issued by FAA in March, 1984. The negotiations moved slowly until FAA submitted
a draft rule for the participants to review.
30. For complete accounts of the two EPA demonstrations, see L. Susskind & G. McMahon,
Documentation of EPA's Nonconformance Penalty Regulatory Negotiation Demonstration (1985)
(Report prepared for the Office of Regulation and Standards of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency); L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, Documentation of EPA's Pesticide Exemption
Regulatory Negotiation Demonstration (July 1985) (Report prepared for the Office of Regulation and
Standards of the United States Environmental Protection Agency).
31. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 42-51.
32. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1985).
Vol. 3: 133, 1985
Negotiated Rulemaking
by Harter and noted by the Administrative Conference seem especially
relevant and worth testing here.
First, people will come to the bargaining table only as long as they
believe negotiations will produce an outcome for them that is as good as or
better than the outcomes that would result from other available methods
of pursuing their interests."3 The concept that parties will pursue their
own best interest in this way is a key assumption in negotiation theory,
popularized by Fisher and Ury under the heading of BATNA (Best
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement)."
Second, the acceptability of negotiation as a dispute resolution process is
determined by relative power,3" another common strand in negotiation
theory. Negotiations will only proceed if the parties are interdependent,
that is, if they are constrained from acting unilaterally. Furthermore, if
the imbalance of power is too great, the less powerful party is sure to seek
an alternative context in which to press its claims, away from the negotia-
tion table.3"
Third, with regard to the issue of scale, fifteen parties is considered the
"rough practical limit" on the number of participants that can work effec-
tively in a negotiated rulemaking.3 7
Fourth, the issues must be readily apparent and the parties must be
ready to address them. 6 Negotiation theorists, drawing in large part on
the history of labor relations in the United States, have consistently identi-
fied "ripeness" as a criterion. 9 In the environmental mediation field,
however, there is substantial disagreement about the relevance of the ripe-
ness argument.40
Fifth, consensus building will be impeded if deeply held beliefs or
values are in conflict."1 If values are incontrovertible, there is no room for
compromise or collaborative problem solving. This is linked to a sixth pre-
condition that Raiffa and others have pointed out-namely, that there
must be two or more issues "on the table" so that parties can maximize
33. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 43.
34. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES 104 (1981).
35. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 43; Cormick, Intervention and Self-Deterrnina-
tion in Environmental Disputes: A Mediator's Perspective, RESOLVE 23 (Winter 1982).
36. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 45; Fisher, Negotiating Power, 27 BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 149-66 (1983).
37. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 46.
38. Cormick, supra note 35, at 4, 6. See also Popper, An Administrative Law Perspective on
Consensual Decision Making, 35 AD. L. REV. 255 (1983).
39. SIMPKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 42 (1971).
40. Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 17-18
(1981).
41. This refers to deeply held, almost theological values, as opposed to how two parties might
value the impact of an emission standard differently.
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their overall interests by trading or bundling issues."' This precondition
for success can best be understood as a restatement of the basic distinction
between "distributive" and "integrative" bargaining."8 In distributive bar-
gaining situations, one side can only win if another side loses-the classic
"zero-sum" situation. In integrative bargaining situations, all sides can
come out ahead by trading across issues or items that they value differ-
ently-the classic "win-win" situation.
Seventh, the pressure of a deadline is necessary for successful negotia-
tion.44 Without a deadline, parties may purposefully delay or fail to focus
on reaching a settlement.
Finally, some method of implementing the final agreements must be
available and acceptable to the parties." Parties must believe that their
agreement will be implemented and that their participation will be worth-
while. The importance of perceptions and commitments in negotiation
cannot be emphasized strongy enough.
While Harter framed his discussion in terms of presumed pre-
conditions for success, some of these same criteria can be recast in terms of
a framework for evaluating the agreements reached through a negotiation
process.
B. A Framework for Evaluating Negotiated Rules
Negotiated rulemaking will only be utilized more broadly if it achieves
better results than the traditional rulemaking process.4  The framework
for evaluating negotiated rulemaking is premised on the baseline criteria
that fairer and wiser rules will be produced at a lower cost. Following
from Harter's discussion of preconditions for success, this framework
should include the following specific criteria.
Each party must feel that the negotiated rule serves its interests at least
as well as the version of the rule most likely to be developed through the
42. H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION, 164-165 (1982). However, as Harter
points out, very few regulations involve single issues. Most proposals can be broken down into
analyzing the scope of the remedy and the substantive and procedural elements of the regulation.
43. LEwICsI & LITrERER, NEGOTIATION 75-129 (1985).
44. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 47. The legislature or courts could establish a
perception of imminence by mandating agency action within a limited time period or the agency could
set and publicize its own time frame for implementing regulatory programs.
45. Id. at 51. Professor Dunlop identified several of the same preconditions as being necessary for
successful labor negotiations. Dunlop, supra note 25, at 1430-43. Political scientists have identified
consensual decisionmaking as a way to reconcile majority and minority goals. See, e.g., T. Lowi, THE
END OF LIBERALisM 31-41 (1969); R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? 315-24 (1961).
46. Note, supra note 1, at 1874-76. See also Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, reprinted
in 1975 D.S.H. REP. (BNA) 884,886; Schuck, Litigation, Bargaining, and Regulation, REGULA-
TION July-Aug. 1979, at 26.
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conventional process. 47 The only way of testing this latter criterion is to
compare the attitudes of the participants at the end of the process with
their initial statements of expectations.
A negotiation should yield realistic commitments from all of those
involved. A rule that satisfies everyone in principal but cannot be imple-
mented is of little use. Not only is the support of the participants impor-
tant, but so too is the support of any interested party. The measure of
success on this score is whether the proposed rule, drafted through the
informal process, can weather the close scrutiny of those who did not par-
ticipate in the negotiation process-and perhaps a "hard look" by the
courts.
The interests of the parties should be so well-reconciled that no possible
joint gains are left unrealized. Changes which would help a party without
harming another party should not be missed.48 If a more elegant method
of reconciling the conflicting interests of the parties is possible, it will
probably emerge once the draft agreement is publicized. Thus, it may take
some time to evaluate fully negotiated rules relative to this criterion.
. The agency should be able to demonstrate that it has upheld its statu-
tory mandate, and the public-at-large should feel satisfied that both the
process and the outcome were fair.49 The perceptions of the parties who
participated in the negotiations and the reactions of those they ostensibly
represented ought to be a good preliminary indicator of success in this
regard. Again, it may take some time to fully evaluate these perceptions.
Relationships among the participants in a negotiation should improve,
not deteriorate, as a result of their interactions. The parties should be in a
better position to deal with their differences in the future. Changed
dynamics can be evaluated by questioning the participants and watching
to see what happens in their subsequent dealings with each other.
The negotiated rule should take account of the best scientific and tech-
nical information available at the time of the negotiation. If, during the
review and comment period, qualified experts testify that important scien-
tific evidence has been ignored or misinterpreted, the result should clear-
ly be judged an inferior or unwise rule. Although the wisdom of the
47. Parties must at least do as well as their BATNA-Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agree-
ment. Fisher and Ury argue that the BATNA provides a standard or floor against which any propo-
sal should be measured. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 34, at 104.
48. H. RAIFFA, supra note 42, at 164-65.
49. Cf Note, supra note 1, at 1871, 1874-76 (alternative models of direct agency involvement in
negotiated rulemaking and agency oversight without participation); Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra
note 7, at 59-66 (advantages and disadvantages of agency participation). Some commentators have
warned against agency participation. Since an agency has the final legal authority, parties might want
to preserve their positions with the agency and therefore would negotiate less freely. Moreover, in its
lead capacity, the agency might dominate the negotiations. However, these issues of inflexibility and
posturing are endemic to all negotiations and not limited to instances where the agency is present.
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negotiated rule will become clear once the rule has been implemented, it
might be disastrous to delay evaluation until that point.
Since negotiated rulemaking is a voluntary effort undertaken by a
regulatory agency to improve its rulemaking procedures and not a
response to legislative or judicial procedural directives, the benefits fore-
cast by proponents of negotiated rulemaking will have to be demonstrated
if agencies are to sustain an interest in the process and if affected parties
are to continue to participate. In the next section, we will examine the
two EPA negotiated rulemaking demonstrations in some detail.
III. EPA's Regulatory Negotiation Demonstrations
The notion of using a negotiated approach to rulemaking at EPA first
emerged during the Carter Administration, when procedural reforms akin
to negotiated rulemaking were tested.5 A top EPA official strongly sup-
ported the idea at major Senate hearings held in 1980.1 While the change
of Administration slowed the momentum, 2 appointment of Joseph
Cannon as Acting Associate Administrator of EPA's Office of Planning
and Resource Management in 1981 brought renewed interest. Cannon
and several other EPA officials had strong personal commitments to vari-
ous regulatory reforms and worked diligently within EPA to develop
backing for the idea of negotiated rulemaking. 3 In the fall of 1982,
Cannon announced that the Agency would move ahead aggressively to
demonstrate the concept. In a January 1983 address to the Conservation
Foundation's National Conference on Environmental Dispute Resolution
50. N. Baldwin, Negotiated Rulemaking: A Case Study of Administrative Reform 25-26 (1983)
(unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT). During the Carter
Administration, two successful experiments with procedural reforms illustrated that informal joint
problem-solving could aid the progress of regulatory decision-making. The first of these reforms
involved the creation of a technical panel which was responsible for making certain complex decisions
regarding pesticides. The second was the adoption of an informal hearing procedure for the water
pollution discharge permitting system, used to improve the efficiency of the existing, more cumbersome
process. In both instances an informal participatory process was employed rather than the formal
hearing method which tends to be more court-like and adversarial. See also Comment, An Alternative
to the Traditional Rulemaking Process: A Case Study of Negotiation in the Development of Regula-
tions, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1505, 1525-35 (1984) (describing the consultation procedure used by the
Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs to gain public input prior to
rulemaking).
51. Regulatory Negotiation Hearings, supra note 25, at 83-84, 94-95 (1980) (statement of Roy
N. Gamse, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Planning and Evaluation, EPA).
52. N. Baldwin, supra note 50, at 25-26. Implementation of Regulatory Negotiation at EPA was
slowed initially by the controversies associated with Administrator Ann Gorsuch.
53. Id. at 25-28. Cannon had been a lawyer involved in litigation prior to his appointment and
was deeply committed to the idea that many disputes were best resolved out of court. This personal
commitment, coupled with the fact that many parties, including industry and the Reagan Administra-
tion's OMB and President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, were supportive of the concept,
prompted Cannon to make negotiated rulemaking his pet project.
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Cannon announced that EPA was ready to develop several rules using
negotiation."
In February 1983, EPA published a notice in the Federal Register
indicating that it intended to pursue the idea of negotiated rulemaking and
used solicitation letters to invite interested parties to suggest candidate
rules.5 This followed more than a year of preliminary staff work at the
Agency." EPA engaged ERM-McGlennon to assist in contacting poten-
tially interested parties5 7 and obtained the services of the Program on
Negotiation at Harvard Law School to document and analyze the upcom-
ing demonstrations.
Dozens of candidate rules, many suggested by senior Agency staff, were
considered carefully. In mid-1983, the agency came very close to selecting
a rule governing disposal of low-level radioactive waste. By November,
however, the Agency ended this effort because of resistance from the envi-
ronmental community."8 In exchange for dropping the low level radio-
active waste rule, EPA asked leaders of key national environmental advo-
cacy groups to suggest other rules for a first demonstration.
A. The Non-Conformance Penalty Rulemaking
Section 206(g) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to issue certificates of
conformity to any class or category of heavy-duty vehicles or engines
which exceeds an emission level, within an allowable upper limit, if the
manufacturer pays a nonconformance penalty (NCP). 9 This penalty is
intended not only to cost the manufacturer of a nonconforming vehicle or
engine as much as compliance with the standard but also to create a
financial disincentive for continued noncompliance.6" Although the Clean
54. Harter, The Experience So Far, supra note 26, at 3.
55. Regulatory Negotiation Project, 48 Fed. Reg. 7494 (1983).
56. EPA made some crucial decisions regarding the proper negotiation procedures. The first of
these was to employ a central staff from the Office of Planning and Program Evaluation to carry out
the process. These individuals played a key role in educating others in the Agency about the regula-
tory negotiation process and worked to ensure that the top leadership at EPA understood the risks
involved and would expend a great deal of time and effort to ensure success.
57. John McGlennon, former EPA Administrator for Region One, directs ERM-McGlennon, a
Boston-based firm specializing in natural resource issues and dispute resolution.
58. L. Susskind & D.Fish, Status Report II: The Pre-Negotiation Phase of Negotiated Rulemak-
ing: The Case of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Rule 7 (June 1984) (unpublished manuscript).
The environmentalists felt that the low level radiation waste rule involved perceptions and values that
differed so greatly among the key stakeholders that successful negotiations were unlikely.
59. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 725(g) (1982).
60. Id. The 1977 Amendments identified specific considerations to be used in estimating noncom-
pliance costs, including: the degree to which emission standards were exceeded; the imposition
periodically of increased penalties in order to incorporate incentives for the development of engines
which are more able to meet the prescribed level of emission reduction; and the removal of any com-
petitive disadvantage to manufacturers who choose to produce engines in compliance with the stan-
dard. Clean Air Act § 206(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982).
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Air Act Amendments were passed in 1977, EPA had not issued NCP
regulations by late 1983. 6'
In December 1983, David Doniger of the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) formally proposed nonconformance penalties to EPA as
a candidate rule for negotiated rulemaking.62 Between December 1983
and March 1984, ERM-McGlennon found widespread support for nego-
tiating the NCP rule among potential stakeholders. Charles Freed, Direc-
tor of EPA's Manufacturers Operations Division, the program office
responsible for the rule, enthusiastically supported using a negotiated
approach, as did the EPA Office of General Counsel and Office of Pro-
gram Planning and Evaluation. Environmentalists were generally sup-
portive, viewing NCPs as a means to accommodate temporary industry
needs while holding industry to technology-forcing standards. Smaller
manufacturers were somewhat wary of the costs of participating in a
negotiated rulemaking and felt that any NCP rule had to preserve their
competitiveness. Larger manufacturers generally supported the proposed
process and felt that they had adequate staff to participate in the pro-
cess.63 In general, all stakeholders felt that the rule was important enough
to merit their involvement and that it did not involve the type of "life and
death" value questions that would have made negotiation-an unfamiliar
process at any rate-appear less workable.
In an April 1984 Federal Register notice, EPA announced its intention
to develop an NCP rule using a regulatory negotiation.6" At an organiza-
tional meeting, also held in April, some twenty participants met to learn
more about the proposed process and to discuss how the negotiations
would proceed. 5 At that time, EPA announced the creation of a $50,000
61. EPA proposed NCP regulations in 1979 but never finalized them. Two years later, in April
1981, the Administration announced numerous regulatory relief measures which would reduce the
economic impact of governmental regulations on industry. This put the NCP regulations on the back-
burner for several more years. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 7-8.
62. Letter from David Doniger to William Ruckelshaus (Dec. 7, 1983), reprinted in L. Susskind
& G. McMahon, supra note 30, at app. B. At the same time Doniger formally notified EPA Admin-
istrator Ruckelshaus of NRDC's intent to sue EPA for failure to publish several rules, including the
NCP rule. Doniger was strengthening his BATNA. See supra note 34.
63. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 34-39.
64. Notice of Intent to Form Advisory Committee, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,577 (1984).
65. The original conflict assessment conducted by ERM-McGlennon produced a list of partici-
pants that included eleven engine manufacturers, five industry associations, two environmental organi-
zations (NRDC and the National Clean Air Coalition), and three environmental agencies or associa-
tions. Subsequently, two other groups asked to participate. Both were accepted, while the Clean Air
Coalition decided to let NRDC represent the environmental concerns. The final list of manufacturing
participants included the Automobile Importers of America, the American Trucking Association, the
Engine Manufacturers Association, the Manufacturers Emission Control Association, General
Motors, Chrysler, International Harvester, ONAN Corporation, Caterpillar Tractor Company, Volvo
Truck Company, Isuzu Motors America, Ford, Mack Truck Corporation, IVECO Trucks of
America, Cummins Engine, Freightline/Mercedes-Benz, and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
tion. The non-manufacturers included the California Air Resource Board, the State and Territorial
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resource pool-a fund that any or all of the participants would be able to
draw upon to cover the costs of technical studies or other costs related to
their participation.66
Negotiations began June 14, 1984, and ended October 12, 1984. In
order to develop some structure for the process, the negotiation facilitator
opened the June session by asking participants to produce a statement of
issues reflecting their interests. A final list of ten issues was synthesized to
help organize the work of the negotiating committee. Three work groups
were formed around the following issues: Application of NCPs, Penalty
Structure and Rate Setting, and NCP Administration and Enforcement.
67
Five one-day negotiating sessions dealing with substantive aspects of the
NCP rule and numerous work group sessions dealing with specific techni-
cal and administrative issues were held during a four month period. The
NCP negotiating committee used over $10,000 to fund an independent
study of a proposed engine testing plan. Other collaborative technical
work was done by committee members who designed a micro-computer-
based spreadsheet model to test the impacts of parameter changes in the
penalty formula."8
The negotiations were conducted under a Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA) charter. 9 Notice of the NCP negotiating committee sessions
was given in the Federal Register, and meetings were open to the public.
The committee eventually reached consensus 70 on all of the issues it origi-
nally identified at the first meeting.
In reaching this consensus, EPA's choice of a facilitator was crucial.
The ERM-McGlennon team, which had extensive mediation experience,
Air Pollution Program Administration, the Colorado Department of Health, the Natural Resources
Defense Council, and EPA/OMB.
66. Because of the many unanswered questions surrounding the issue of intervenor funding, EPA
thought it wise to raise private foundation funds to supplement the Agency's contribution to the
resource pool, a task requiring substantial effort. An independent body, the American Arbitration
Association, was given sole responsibility for the management of these funds.
67. Each working group was responsible for its own subset of issues. L. Susskind & G. McMa-
hon, supra note 30, at 73.
68. d. at 156-157.
69. The use of a FACA charter (Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.app. § 1-14 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1985)) situates the negotiating committee within the labyrinths of existing federal adminis-
trative procedures. Among the FACA requirements are: 1) the negotiating committee is constituted as
an advisory group to EPA, chartered by the General Services Administration of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget; 2) meetings must be open to the public and controlled by the agency; 3) formation
of the group and meeting schedules must be announced in the Federal Register; and, 4) detailed
minutes must be kept of all meetings. Additionally, FACA requires close scrutiny of advisory commit-
tees by Congress and the executive branch. There is some uncertainty about whether FACA applies to
negotiated rulemaking-type groups. The Administrative Conference of the United States has con-
cluded that such uncertainty about the applicability of FACA has tended to discourage useful contacts
between the agency and nongovernmental sectors.
70. Consensus is defined supra note 26. See also H. RAIFFA, supra note 42, at 218-25, for a
description of the use of joint fact finding in the mediation of conflicts.
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took the lead in generating agreement on a detailed agenda and work
schedule, organizing work group meetings at which components of the
final version of the regulation were drafted, and convening the full group
to review these work group drafts. It also assumed responsibility for the
preparation of detailed minutes of all committee meetings and of the com-
plete draft of the final rule. Finally, the facilitation team initiated
caucuses during and outside of meetings, maintained frequent contact with
all participants, and intervened quite actively during several of the
sessions.
71
After the last negotiation session on October 12, 1984, in which all the
issues were resolved, a four-member subcommittee-consisting of EPA,
state, environmental, and industry representatives-was given the respon-
sibility of translating the tentative agreement into a consensus document.
A first draft was circulated in mid-October, and comments were solicited.
The subcommittee then used several conference calls to prepare the final
draft that was signed by the entire committee in December 1984.
With the consensus statement signed by all participants, EPA published
its notice of proposed rulemaking on March 6, 1985.72 Only thirteen com-
ments were received during the comment period, all in support of the
committee's proposal. The final rule was promulgated without opposition
on August 30, 1985.78
B. The Pesticide Exemption Rule
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1972 Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) specify that registration appli-
cations for new pesticides must include information demonstrating the
potential risks they pose to human health. 4 Unfortunately, at present,
there is no completely reliable empirical test of a substance's relative tox-
icity or safety. Data used to demonstrate such properties are drawn chiefly
from lifetime-exposure animal bioassays. Completion of such tests for a
new compound may take two years. This means that it might take four
years to move a new pesticide from development to commercial use.
Neither the agricultural users nor the producers of such products find this
time frame acceptable.7 5 Section 18 of FIFRA gives the Administrator of
EPA discretionary authority to exempt a state or federal agency from any
provisions of the Act if it is determined that an emergency condition exists
71. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 126, 171-175.
72. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 50 Fed. Reg. 9204 (1985).
73. Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,374 (1985).
74. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982).
75. L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra note 30, at 2.
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which requires an exemption."8 Given the uncertainty of much of the
required scientific information, such discretion has the potential for
misuse.
In March of 1983, EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs published an
internal audit of Section 18." The audit concluded that there had been a
dramatic increase in the number of exemptions requested. The House
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agri-
culture expressed concern that states or industries might be using Section
18 to circumvent more stringent data and risk control requirements which
apply to registration.
7 8
Prompted by this audit and resulting Congressional concern, EPA
began to review the Section 18 regulations in January 1984. The Agency
held three public hearings to solicit recommendations. In August 1984,
EPA published a Federal Register notice declaring its intent to form an
advisory committee to develop new Section 18 regulations."
The Section 18 rule was proposed as a candidate for negotiated
rulemaking by the National Audubon Society.80 In agreeing to a negoti-
ated format, the Office of Pesticide Programs stipulated that the negotia-
tions span no more than four months and indicated that if no consensus
were reached by that time, the Agency would dissolve the committee and
promulgate regulations drafted internally. An advanced notice of pro-
posed rulemaking was published in the Federal Register on April 8,
1985.82
As in the NCP demonstration, a central staff from the Office of
Planning and Policy Evaluation was employed to carry out the negotiated
rulemaking and ERM-McGlennon was selected as convenor, with respon-
sibilities for completing pre-negotiation activities. In contrast with the
NCP experience, however, the EPA Policy Office made a decision to ap-
point a facilitator other than the convenor. The new facilitator would be
76. Exemption of Federal and State Agencies for the Use of Pesticides Under Emergency
Conditions, 40 C.F.R. § 166 (1985).
77. Registration Division, Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA, Audit of Emergency Exemption
and Special Local Needs Programs as Authorized Under Section 18 and 24(c) of FIFRA (1983).
78. The Pesticide Regulatory Program Study: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Department
Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1983)
79. L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra note 30, at 7.
80. Id. at 4-5. Interviews conducted with all participants before the demonstrations revealed that
environmentalists wanted to develop an exemption procedure limited to true emergencies. In general,
there was a feeling that exemptions were being granted too frequently.
81. Id. Preliminary interviews with all participants did not indicate that this time frame was a
major problem, unlike the NCP negotiated rulemaking, where the timetable was thought to be a
problem by most participants at the start of the negotiations.
82. Exemption of Federal and State Agencies for Use of Pesticides Under Emergency Conditions,
50 Fed. Reg. 13,944 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.166).
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responsible for the remaining responsibilities, which are concentrated
heavily in the negotiation and post-negotiation stages, including con-
ducting and mediating meetings and insuring that consensus is achieved.
Moreover, EPA decided to experiment with the use of an "inside"
facilitator-someone who worked for EPA but was not associated with the
EPA office directly involved in negotiating the rule. EPA was determined
to explore the advantages and disadvantages of using an "honest broker"
from within the Agency to facilitate a negotiated rulemaking despite
doubts raised by groups such as the Conservation Foundation about how
the neutrality of such a facilitator would be viewed."3 LaJuana Wilcher, a
special assistant to the Office of General Counsel, was selected as the
mediator.
ERM-McGlennon again conducted preliminary interviews with poten-
tially interested parties and eventually produced a list of sixteen likely
participants, in addition to EPA.84 The sixteen included four environmen-
tal groups, four state organizations, four agricultural user groups, two
manufacturers, and the USDA.8" The basis for selection lay primarily in
the participants' familiarity and past involvement with FIFRA and
Section 18, their ability to represent important interests, and their willing-
ness to participate. 86 Six additional parties were added after they submit-
ted requests to participate at the preliminary organizational meeting.,
The final group of twenty-two members was proposed by EPA to be a
formal advisory committee under FACA.
An introductory meeting of the committee was held on August 16,
1984. With the help oftERM-McGlennon and the EPA facilitator, the
group agreed upon an agenda, organized subcommittees to work on the
various issues, adopted protocols (including guidelines for the use of a
83. L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra note 30, at 6-7. It may be difficult for participants to
believe that the interests of an EPA Program Office do not somehow influence the behavior of a
"neutral" facilitator from another EPA office.
84. Id. at 6, 8. Potential stakeholders were identified for ERM-McGlennon by EPA's Office of
Pesticide Programs (OPP), by the participants themselves during interviews, and from transcripts of
testimony at the January 1984 hearings. Several rounds of interviews narrowed the number of partici-
pants to 16, although no upper limit on participants had been set by EPA. Id. at app. 6-7.
85. Id. app. 7 at 2. Environmental organizations included National Audubon Society, National
Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides, National Wildlife Federation, and Defenders of Wildlife.
State organizations included National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, Association of
State and Territorial Health Officials, State FIFRA Issues Research Group, and Assocation of Amer-
ican Pesticide Control Officials. Pesticide user groups were the Pesticide Users Advisory Committee,
American Farm Bureau Federation, California Citrus Council, Florida Citrus Mutual, and National
Food Processors Association. Manufacturers were represented by the National Agricultural Chemical
Association. Federal Agencies included USDA and EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs.
86. Id. app. 7 at 1-2.
87. The six groups were American Seed Trade Association, Interregional Research Project No. 4,
National Association of Wheat Growers, National Cattlemen's Association, National Corn Growers
Association, and the National Cotton Councils. See id. list of participants at iv-v.
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$50,000 resource pool), and specified the technical information they
needed to start.88 EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs, the Agency repre-
sentative in the negotiations, provided a draft of the preamble and regula-
tion at the outset, in contrast to the relatively clean slate with which the
NCP committee began. This draft provided the committee with considera-
ble guidance in structuring its discussions.8 9
Negotiations began September 28, 1984, and ended January 16, 1985.
There were six formal sessions, three of which lasted two days each.
Smaller work groups were organized around the three key issue ar-
eas-Definition of Emergency, Health and Safety, and Implementa-
tion-and met as needed. The earlier meetings were devoted primarily to
fact-finding, while the latter ones became more issue oriented, with alli-
ances often developing. Late in the negotiations, participants seemed to
become more willing to take strong stands or negotiate assertively." Much
of the substance of the agreement was finalized during the last two-day
meeting. 91
As it turned out, the resource pool was not needed to finance technical
assistance, as it was in the NCP demonstration. Due to the nature of the
criteria for exemption, negotiations did not revolve around conflicts over
the legitimacy of scientific evidence but were concerned with more general
decisions often involving definitions. When differences in the interpreta-
tion of technical matters did arise, however, participants in the second
demonstration were able to resolve them satisfactorily without outside
research.92
Although the EPA facilitator was not as active as the ERM-
McGlennon staff had been in the NCP negotiation, participants in the
Section 18 negotiations were able to reach agreement at the sixth and final
meeting. The consensus agreement was signed on January 16, 1985, and
published as a proposed rulemaking on April 8, 1985.9' Nineteen
comments were received during the public comment period; three of these
were from participants and supported the proposal. 94 The others raised
88. Id. at 7-11.
89. See id. at 58. In other circumstances, a similar maneuver could easily have been used to coerce
them into following EPA's lead.
90. Id. at 71.
91. Id. at ii.
92. Id. at 137.
93. Proposed Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,944 (1985).
94. In an interesting provision, participants agreed that the consensus statement was not binding
and did not preclude entities or persons who may be members of the signing organization (i.e. the
umbrella organization) from submitting comments individually, but did prohibit the signing organiza-
tions themselves from commenting. Three organizations apparently took this circuitous route to show
their added support. L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra note 30, at 107-09.
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relatively minor points.9" EPA sent copies of the comments to the partici-
pants, but the groups decided to support EPA's final draft without
reconvehing. The final rule is expected to be published in the Federal
Register in January 1986. 9"
C. Outlines of the Process in Practice
Based on EPA's experiences, we suggest that negotiated rulemaking can
best be understood as a three-stage process. During the first stage-pre-
negotiation-the agency decides whether to negotiate a specific rule and
gives appropriate notice of its intentions in the Federal Register. A cnve-
nor is then designated by the agency to identify the likely stakeholders and
to convince them to send senior representatives to the negotiating table.
The convenor must work with all the relevant parties to organize an in-
troductory session, cope with subsequent requests for permission to par-
ticipate, develop deadlines and draft a set of ground rules to guide the
proceedings, and assist the participants in obtaining the technical and
financial resources they need to proceed, including training in negotiation
if the parties desire it. Essentially, the convenor seeks to uncover and re-
move obstacles to negotiating the rule. If he or she fails to convince most
of the key parties to come to the table or if the necessary resources cannot
be obtained, the convenor can call the process to a halt. While the conve-
nor is laying the groundwork for the process, the agency central staff
should coordinate the internal decision to use negotiated rulemaking,
gather the necessary financial resources, tend to the mandatory notice re-
quirements, and prepare a request for a FACA charter.
During the second stage-negotiation-the parties need to structure a
work program, agenda, and timetable; undertake a process of joint fact
finding, using consultants if necessary; organize subcommittees or working
groups to develop preliminary drafts of proposals; confront major differ-
ences in their interests; produce careful summaries of the agreements
reached at their meetings; and prepare a written draft of the proposed
rule for all the participants, including the agency, to circulate for review.
The success of these efforts depends in large measure on the assistance
provided by a non-partisan facilitator acceptable to all the parties. The
facilitator might be the original convenor.
95. The comments focused on very specific language and clarification of particular aspects of the
rule and did not involve the more general criticisms which are common in the traditional rulemaking
notice and comment period. Telephone interview with Chris Kirtz, EPA Regulatory Negotiation Pro-
ject Director (Nov. 15, 1985).
96. Id.
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During the final stage-post-negotiation-the facilitator should assist
the parties in winning support for the draft agreement from their constitu-
ents or members and arrange for a formal signing that will commit the
participants to support the final draft during the review and comment
period. Following review and comment, the agency may decide to recon-
vene the participants, but not necessarily as a formal committee, to review
the comments received and to discuss the agency's decisions regarding the
language of the final rule.
IV. Comparing Theory to Practice
Based on the evaluative framework described earlier and first-hand
observations of EPA's experience, both of EPA's demonstrations must be
judged successful.9" Detailed interviews with the participants indicated
that almost every one of them felt that his or her group's interests were
well served by the negotiated agreements. While they were surprised at
the amount of time and effort it took to negotiate a consensus rule, they
agreed that the time invested up-front reduced the overall amount of time
involved in litigation and subsequent administrative wrangling.
Many of the participants felt that the negotiated outcome was far better
than what they might have expected had they gone to court.98 Versions of
the two agreements that would have helped some parties more without
hurting the others did not emerge during or after the review and comment
process, and both rules were formally adopted without court challenge.
Thus, the first step toward implementation was completed successfully.
The relevant technical staffs at EPA felt that the Agency's statutory
mandate had been upheld in both instances and that the wisest possible
rules had emerged. Furthermore, the relationships among the parties,
many of whom came into the negotiations with a long history of harsh
adversarial relations, improved markedly. The participants were left in a
better position to deal with each other in the future.99 The parties not
97. See supra note 30. In the first demonstration, the manufacturers were almost unanimous in
their conclusion that the negotiation produced a better rule than the conventional process would have
produced. Non-manufacturers also felt that the rule was probably better. Improvement was attributed
to the opportunity stakeholders with varying interests had to probe each other's positions directly
rather than working through EPA. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 133-34. In the
second demonstration, negotiators for the growers and other agricultural interests were nearly unani-
mous in their view that negotiation produced a rule more representative of their interests with less
conflict. Environmental representatives also offered a positive assessment of regulatory negotiations
relative to the standard notice and comment procedure. One said that the environmental community
"wouldn't have permitted EPA to take Section 18 through standard rulemaking." Agency representa-
tives as a group were not inclined to forecast a vastly different outcome had negotiations not been
used. L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra note 30, at 117-18.
98. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 133.
99. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 180; L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra
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only agreed to sign the negotiated rule, they agreed to support it during
the review and comment process. All in all, in the eyes of the participants
and others closely observing the process, negotiated rulemaking appeared
to produce more legitimate outcomes at a lower cost than usual.1 00
The results of EPA's two demonstrations offer the first full-fledged
opportunity to reexamine the hypothetical claims of both the proponents
and the critics of negotiated rulemaking and to suggest refinements in the
provisional theory.
A. Rule Selection
EPA's experience proves the importance of the theorists' prescriptions
for rule selection. First, parties are unlikely to make the necessary conces-
sions to reach consensus if the only way to reach agreement is to compro-
mise fundamental values or beliefs.10 1 Second, success in a negotiation
depends on having a large enough range of issues or options to allow
trade-offs or creative packaging.'0 2
EPA's first candidate rule was rejected by key environmental groups
because they felt that it was impossible to negotiate and engage in com-
promise over a de minimis rule regarding low-level radioactive waste dis-
posal. As far as they were concerned, the de minimis level had to be zero.
Since compromise was impossible, negotiations would be fruitless.
In contrast to this first attempt, EPA's two demonstration rules involved
a range of sub-issues to which various groups attached different degrees of
importance. This enabled them to make trades that led to "win-win"
packages that everyone could support. Perhaps even more importantly,
both demonstrations centered on the distribution of economic gains and
losses and not on EPA's right to regulate. As long as the Agency achieved
its basic objectives, it was willing to work with the other participants to
allocate gains and losses fairly. Neither of EPA's first two demonstrations
involved fundamental value conflicts. The question remains, though, as to
what proportion of the rules issued each year revolves around distributive
bargaining ("win-lose") issues and what proportion lends itself to integra-
tive ("win-win") bargaining.
B. Incentives to Negotiate
The theorists suggest that interested parties will choose not to partici-
pate in a negotiation if they feel that their alternatives away from the
note 30, at 111-13, 131-32, 146.
100. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 133-34.
101. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 49.
102. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 122 (1982).
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bargaining table will produce better results."' 3 The EPA experience sug-
gests that parties to a proposed rulemaking may not be sure of their
BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), and this uncer-
tainty may help bring them to the bargaining table.
In both demonstrations, each group's BATNA was diminished by the
willingness of all the other parties to participate in the demonstrations.
Unless all the key groups refused to participate, any group that decided to
hold out and challenge the rule in court at a later time would face diffi-
culty mustering allies for such a challenge. Moreover, while the courts
have not indicated whether they will set aside the "hard look" doctrine in
instances where a well-managed negotiated rulemaking effort has been
completed, the possibility of such a court response increases the uncer-
tainty of a hold-out strategy and makes cooperation by all interested par-
ties almost inevitable.104
Many of the groups involved in the conventional rulemaking process
spend a great deal of their resources trying to influence agency decision-
making. Many of the same groups complain that the review and comment
process does not come until after the agency has already committed itself
to a course of action. For these groups, the offer to negotiate a draft of the
proposed rule was too attractive to pass up. If the interest groups failed to
get what they wanted from EPA, they knew they could walk away and
block consensus. For most of the participants, the prospect of negotiation
thus looked as good as, if not better than, their alternatives, and participa-
tion did not preclude them from pursuing other options later.
In sum, many of the groups were unsure of what policy options the
other groups might pursue, and this uncertainty affected their decisions.
Working behind the scenes, the convenor may have encouraged participa-
tion and altered the parties' estimates of their BATNAs by manipulating
this uncertainty and changing their perceived costs and benefits. The con-
venor urged participants to consider the advantages of interacting with the
Agency before it had committed itself to a draft of the proposed rule and
reassured them that the process was voluntary and that they could quit at
any time.
C. Unequal Power
Harter has suggested that negotiated rulemaking will fail if any party
can achieve its goals without having to deal with others.10 5 He has also
implied that the more powerful negotiators will achieve their aims, while
103. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 34, at 104.
104. See infra text accompanying note 133.
105. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 45.
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the less powerful interests are likely to be disappointed. The EPA demon-
strations did not support these hypotheses. In both instances environmen-
tal interest groups were outnumbered and came into the negotiations with
what the other parties perceived as uncertain power." 6 They were, how-
ever, quite capable of holding their own in the negotiations. In fact, in the
eyes of some of the participants, the environmental group representatives
exerted substantial influence over the final agreements.'0 7
Individual negotiating skills also altered traditional power relations,
and the number of representatives was secondary to the negotiating abili-
ties of each participant. Generally, participants in both demonstrations en-
tered the negotiations without a great deal of negotiation experience, even
though some were quite familiar with adversarial proceedings. The initial
negotiation training provided by the facilitator may have helped equalize
ability levels.
Certainly the availability of the resource pool gave many of the groups
a sense of equal access to information and technical advice. The resource
pool helped to even up some of the sharp disparities in the availability of
financial resources and provided assurance to even the least well-to-do
groups that their representatives would be able to cover the costs of partic-
ipating in all meetings.
Further, even when unequal political power exists, the process of facili-
tated negotiation appears to impose some constraints on the exercise of
that power. For example, EPA certainly reserved the right to walk away
from the table at any time and write whatever rule it wanted, but the
Agency did not want to appear responsible for the failure of the negotia-
tion effort. The presence of a non-partisan facilitator who could report
objectively on which groups had reason to feel co-opted or treated unfairly
may have provided a check on the actions of the more powerful parties.
Furthermore, power in negotiations is quite fluid. Certain power rela-
tionships were altered during the negotiations as "less powerful" groups
coalesced behind certain strong arguments and formed coalitions. Harter
and others seem to have overlooked the impact of coalition formation on
the outcome of a negotiated rulemaking. They also appear to have under-
estimated the impact of momentum as the drive toward consensus held
some of the more recalcitrant groups in check. As Fisher has pointed out,
a party's power in negotiations depends on a number of factors, including
skill and knowledge, alternatives to a negotiated agreement, the ability to
form coalitions, and financial and human resources.1 08 Unequal power
106. L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra note 30, at 34.
107. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 144.
108. Fisher, supra note 36, at 153.
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entering a negotiated rulemaking turned out to be much less of a problem
than Harter and others imagined because the process empowers all the
parties in various ways and constrains the most powerful.
D. Scale
Harter was quite clear regarding his presumption about the maximum
scale at which a negotiated rulemaking could proceed successfully.109 He
claimed that approximately fifteen participants would be the maximum,
but his supposition is not borne out by the EPA experience.
Through indirect delegation of representation, skillful facilitation, and
the use of subcommittees, EPA was able to include more than twenty-five
participants in its demonstrations.' 10  Most public decision-making
processes are not facilitated, so very few people are familiar with anything
other than the back-and-forth pattern of public discourse which gets
harder to manage as the number of people involved grows. Facilitation by
a skilled professional, on the other hand, can insure effective communica-
tion among much larger numbers of people.
EPA was also able to accommodate larger numbers of participants by
breaking larger groups into smaller working groups to complete tasks that
might otherwise have been too difficult to handle in a group of twenty-
five. These tasks included generating draft documents for the full commit-
tee to consider. As negotiating groups get larger, additional working
groups may be used to ensure full participation by all interested parties.
Harter implied that the fifteen participants would represent fifteen
groups. In fact, through a process of pyramiding representation managed
by a skillful convenor during the pre-negotiation phase, a great many
more groups can become involved indirectly in negotiated rulemaking.
During the conflict assessments undertaken by ERM-McGlennon, it
became clear that some groups were prepared to sit out the negotiations as
long as they could be assured that other particular groups with common
interests would be participating."" Many of the individual participants
had alternates who could sit in for them when other commitments
prevented them from attending meetings, and participants were often ac-
companied by staff when they attended negotiation sessions. If observers
are also counted, at times there were more than thirty-five individuals
109. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 46.
110. In the second demonstration the ERM mediators felt that 25 was close to the practical limit
on the number of parties that could be managed effectively by a mediation team of two or three
people. L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra note 30, at 135.
111. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 20-21.
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present at scheduled sessions. A rough practical limit on the number of
participants should certainly exceed twenty-five.
E. Ripeness
Like many other negotiation theorists, Harter suggests that issues must
be readily apparent and that parties must be ready to address them if a
negotiation is to succeed.11 The EPA experience, however, challenges the
importance of this criterion.
EPA hired a convenor to undertake a conflict assessment aimed at iden-
tifying potential stakeholding parties. Many of those contacted were not
aware that a negotiation on an issue of concern to them was about to take
place."' Many of those who actually participated were only vaguely
aware of some of the technical aspects of the rules under discussion. Addi-
tionally, at the outset of the negotiations, there was reluctance on the part
of some of the administrators within EPA to participate in the
demonstrations.
When the parties arrived at the initial organizational sessions for each
of the negotiated rulemakings, they were confronted with the task of set-
ting a detailed agenda of items to be discussed. While everyone knew that
the product of the negotiation process was supposed to be a draft rule,
they were vague in preliminary interviews with regard to the appropriate
range of issues to discuss. 1"
Even the agencies directly involved in negotiations had conflicting ideas
about their authority and appropriate roles. EPA and OMB differed at
the outset regarding the appropriate scope of the two FACA charters "'
and the role that OMB would play in the negotiations. OMB felt it
should not participate directly since it wanted to reserve the option of
disapproving the negotiated rule if, in its judgment, the rule was cost-
ineffective pursuant to Executive Order 12,291."'
From a theoretical standpoint, EPA's two demonstrations thus did not
meet the criterion of ripeness. Yet, even with the confusion about who
would participate and what the agenda would be, the demonstrations were
successful. This merely confirms the inappropriateness of the ripeness cri-
terion. Most public dispute resolution efforts are likely to involve a
112. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 47; see also Popper, supra note 38, at 286;
Cormick, supra note 35, at 46.
113. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30; L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg, supra note 30.
114. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 72.
115. Telephone Interview with Chris Kirtz, EPA Regulatory Negotiation Project Director (Sep-
tember 1985); Telephone Interview with Nell Minnow, OMB (September 1985).
116. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), 3 C.F.R. pt. 127 (1981). Executive
Order 12,291 gives OMB responsibility for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of proposed rules.
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changeable and expandable agenda and a shifting set of interest groups
who are not quite clear why they are at the table.
F. Deadlines
Harter and others have argued for the importance of deadlines as a tool
for keeping the negotiations moving and for avoiding dilatory tactics." 7 In
most labor-management negotiations, the greatest progress traditionally
occurs close to the final deadline. In accordance with this view, EPA ini-
tially set tight deadlines. In the first demonstration, the Agency actually
shortened the deadline early in the process, thereby angering partici-
pants." 8 Somewhat to their surprise, however, participants were able to
reach agreement even with the shortened schedule. Adverse effects became
apparent when participants felt they needed more time to check back with
their constitutents for reactions to the proposed agreement.
While the deadlines played a helpful role at the outset, the willingness
of all parties to negotiate in "good faith" and with a great deal of energy
proved to be as significant as the tight negotiating schedule.
G. The Concerns of the Critics
The EPA demonstrations address many of the concerns mentioned
regarding negotiated rulemaking. Some of the critics have charged that
interests that ought to be represented would be absent for one reason or
another. Stewart has expressed concern that ad hoc processes of selecting
participants might not produce sufficient or credible representation."0
Other observers have expressed doubts about the ability of ad hoc repre-
sentatives to speak for their constituents or to bind their members. 2 °
EPA's success, however, suggests that the openness of the Federal Regis-
ter notice procedures plus the thoroughness of the convenor's nation-wide
solicitation can produce credible representation. If key groups had been
missed, their views would undoubtedly have emerged during the review
and comment process. They did not. Also, EPA had considerable success
identifying effective organizational spokespeople to participate in the
demonstrations. Since there was much at stake for the organizations in-
volved, they did not have to be persuaded to send top-level people.
A number of critics have also expressed concern about the "delegation
problem"-the abrogation of agency responsibility implied by the willing-
ness of an agency to agree ahead of time to be bound by a negotiated
117. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 47.
118. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 74-82.
119. Interview with Richard Stewart, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School (September 1985).
120. Rodwin, 3 ENVTL. IMPAcT ASSESSMENT REV. 376 (1982).
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consensus.1" Because negotiated rulemaking can be viewed as the sharing
of promulgation powers with private citizens who are not accountable to
the electorate, delegation issues warrant careful attention. However, it is
important not to exaggerate the magnitude of the problem. A review of
the two EPA demonstrations shows that the Agency did not in any way
abdicate its administrative responsibilities.
EPA promised the participants that the Agency would "live with" a
consensus rule, publishing it as a notice of proposed rulemaking. The
Agency was not agreeing to defer to the group and support an unknown
quantity, however, since the Agency itself, as a direct participant in the
negotiations, had the equivalent of a veto over any consensus. Nor were
the top-level agency officials delegating authority to low-level officials sit-
ting at the negotiating table. Every participant knew that the EPA repre-
sentatives had to do as much checking back with superiors as did the
others at the table. Moreover, EPA sought FACA charters for both its
committees, and it attempted to comply with the letter of the law since it
ran all of the full negotiating sessions on an open basis. Thus, the partici-
pants were members of official Agency advisory committees, and EPA was
not delegating its authority to a group of private citizens.
121. H. Perritt, supra note 27, at 160-63. Perritt concluded in his report to ACUS that if an
agency delegates its authority to a group of private citizens, further delegation problems are
presented. One such problem is whether such delegation is within the agency's authority dele-
gated from the Congress. Another problem is that the private delegates are even less accounta-
ble politically than the agency officials.
Compliance with the delegation doctrine has concerned proponents of negotiated rulemak-
ing. While it is appropriate to think about delegation issues associated with negotiated
rulemaking, it is important not to exaggerate the magnitude of the problem. The early propo-
nents of regulatory negotiation offered a number of reasons why violation of the delegation
doctrine does not result from negotiated rulemaking.
First, under all the current conceptions of negotiated rulemaking, and clearly reflected in the
ACUS guidelines, negotiators play only an advisory role in the agency; the agency retains the
final decisionmaking authority. Such an advisory role has been approved by the courts in a
variety of circumstances. Second, the nature of negotiated rulemaking, if it is pursued under
ACUS guidelines, ensures adequacy of representation of affected groups. Thus it provides its
own form of political accountability, which probably is greater than when the agency makes
rules unilaterally. Thus negotiated rulemaking avoids the problem of unaccountable decision-
making that the delegation doctrine is intended to avoid.
It bears emphasizing that the delegation doctrine overlaps other requirements imposed on
agency decisionmaking under the APA and substantive statutes. In a real sense, delegation
problems are avoided when rules are subject to judicial review under APA standards. In other
words, the delegation doctrine is embodied in APA requirements and need not be addressed
separately.
There are thus two entirely independent ways for negotiated rulemaking to satisfy the dele-
gation doctrine. First, if the rule ultimately resulting from negotiated rulemaking passes judi-
cial scrutiny under the arbitrary-and-capricious, within-statutory-authority, and in-accord-
with-statutory procedures standards, it perforce has passed muster under the delegation doc-
trine. Second, if the affected interests have been represented fairly in the negotiation process,
political accountability exists, and there is no need to be wary of delegation because the harm
it seeks to avoid has been avoided ab initio.
Id.
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Nevertheless, Harter has raised the concern that negotiated rulemaking
may contravene the policy against ex parte communication contained in
the Administrative Procedure Act. 22 Perritt successfully counters Harter's
concerns in his report to the Administrative Conference of the United
States and concludes, based in part on his own analysis of the results of
the EPA demonstrations, that ex parte contact will be found permissible
by a court.12 In addition, Perritt argues a balanced selection of interest
representatives, consultation focused solely on policy rather than factual
matters after the record is closed, and the placing of summaries of the
negotiations in the record are likely to satisfy the court. According to Per-
ritt, caucuses and work group meetings can be closed without violating the
terms of FACA. Since EPA gave notice of all of its full negotiation ses-
sions, it complied with its FACA charter and the Sunshine Rules. How-
ever, EPA may not have met all the relevant notice requirements for some
of its subcommittee meetings.
In some respects, negotiated rulemaking efforts cannot fail. At the very
least, conflicts can be clarified, data shared, and differences aired in a
constructive way. Even if full consensus is not achieved, the negotiation
process may still have narrowed the issues in dispute. While the issue did
not explicitly arise in either EPA demonstration, the question of what
would happen if consensus was not reached was very much on the minds
of the participants. Most of the participants indicated that they thought
the Agency would not ignore even partial agreements when fashioning the
final rule, in order to head off some of the legal challenges that might
otherwise occur.
V. Reflections on the Success of Negotiated Rulemaking
. In retrospect, EPA appears to have made a number of important deci-
sions that helped to ensure the success of its first two demonstrations.
Most of these decisions focused on the processes involved in conducting
122. Harter, Cure for Malaise, supra note 7, at 12, 22.
123. A rule ultimately adopted by the agency must be supported by factual information contained
in the official record. Persons with an interest in the content of the rule must be afforded an opportu-
nity to know the factual basis for the rule and to challenge facts submitted by opponents in an adver-
sarial context. If the negotiation takes place among appropriately balanced interest representatives, the
opportunity for adversarial exploration of policy and factual issues is preserved in the negotiation
itself. Consultation between the agency and the negotiation participants after the "record" is closed
should be permissible so long as such consultation focuses on policy rather than new factual matters.
Placing summaries of discussions in the "record" so that non-parties to the discussions can know of
their substance and have an opportunity to respond, while not necessary in every case, enhances the
likelihood that the ex parte contact will be found permissible by a court. H. Perritt, supra note 27, at
171-73. See also, Note, supra note 1, at 1871-89.
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such a demonstration, an area little addressed by either proponents or
critics of negotiated rulemaking. Yet these decisions appear crucial to the
success and legitimacy of EPA's demonstrations. First, EPA designated
one portion of the Agency to manage the negotiations process while rely-
ing on a separate section of the Agency to represent EPA's interests in the
negotiations. Second, EPA worked hard to establish a resource pool that
the participants themselves were allowed to manage. Third, the Agency
focused on the drafting of a written agreement. Fourth, EPA gave the
facilitator substantial latitude and independence.
EPA made a crucial decision to designate the Office of Planning and
Program Evaluation (OPPE) to coordinate its negotiated rulemaking
demonstrations. It is not likely that these functions would have been han-
dled as credibly by a section of the Agency which had to function at the
same time as an interested party in the negotiations. The individuals in
this office played a key role in educating others in the Agency about the
negotiated approach to rulemaking. OPPE staff selected a convenor and
solicited proposed rules from all sections of the Agency, and it worked to
ensure that the top leadership at EPA understood the risk involved and
would throw its weight behind the effort.124 The same central staff con-
tracted with an outside evaluation team to ensure that there would be an
independent analysis of the results.
The resource pool also proved an important factor for success. OPPE
staff worked extremely hard to assemble the funds for a resource pool.
Because of the many unanswered questions surrounding the issue of inter-
venor funding, EPA thought it wise to raise private foundation funds to
supplement the Agency's contribution to the resource pool.'" 5 Once the
124. The active backing of top EPA officials was identified as one of the most important condi-
tions for success in the first EPA demonstration. Significant barriers to implementing the demonstra-
tion emerged whenever "12th floor" support flagged. There needs to be top level pressure on the EPA
Program Offices to suggest candidate rules and to clearly define the process they will use to incorpo-
rate the product of negotiated rulemaking efforts into a NPRM; on hesitant stakeholders to encourage
their participation; on the EPA Office of General Counsel to move quickly and authoritatively to
resolve resource pool-related uncertainties such as the intervenor funding question; on OMB to define
clearly and publicly its role in the funding process; and on the EPA "team" to ensure OMB's good
faith participation in the negotiations and to ensure a speedy regulatory review of the consensus state-
ment and NPRM.
125. In July 1984, Philip Harter prepared a memorandum for the NCP negotiating committee
regarding intervenor funding and conflict of interest statutes entitled Advisory Committee Members
and the Federal Conflict of Interest Statutes reprinted in L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note
30, at app. C.
Drawing on the Susskind & McMahon report, Wilson writes:
Doniger (staff attorney at NRDC and the environmental representative at the NCP regulatory
negotiations) reported at the July meeting that he had not yet drafted the position paper on
compensation, as he was still awaiting the results of legal research being conducted indepen-
dently by Philip Harter. At this point NRDC was not alone among negotiation participants
who felt that, with limited funding, they were not on an equal footing with other groups
having larger in-house technical and research resources; but NRDC was the only one actively
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funds were in hand, EPA agreed to turn them over to an independent
body to hold. By working with the participants to develop guidelines for
the use of these funds, EPA not only assuaged some of the parties' con-
cerns about having too few resources to participate effectively, but it also
underscored the Agency's commitment to the negotiation process.
In the first demonstration, the NCP negotiating committee used over
$10,000 from the resource pool to fund an independent study of a pro-
posed engine testing plan. Other collaborative technical work was done by
committee members who designed a microcomputer-based spread sheet
model to test the impacts of penalty formula parameter changes on pen-
alty fees."2 6 In the eyes of the participants, this joint modelling effort was
absolutely crucial to the success of the negotiation. 2 It avoided the typical
pattern of adversarial science-each side calling on its technical experts to
discredit the work of the others.
Working from a single negotiating text proved important in focusing
the negotiations. In the first demonstration, EPA asked the participants to
produce a statement of policies that would guide the Agency in formulat-
ing the specific language of the rule. In the second demonstration, the
pushing for per diem compensation as the answer to redressing the balance. The implications
of this situation for the future success of the NCP negotiations were disturbing. About half of
the manufacturing representatives still opposed compensating NRDC from the resource poo!.
But NRDC was the only environmental group represented on the negotiating team, and
Doniger still had not signed on formally as a participant. 'Indeed, he gave every indication that
he would not sign on until his interests regarding compensation were met' (especially the long
term concern about funding that is replicable, doesn't cut into NRDC's normal fundraising
pool, and doesn't conflict with NRDC's by-laws regarding receipt of funds from groups with
possible conflicts of interest).
Harter's paper on compensation issues under federal administrative law was available by
the time of the next resource pool subcommittee meeting on July 26, but its length and level of
detail was such that it raised many more questions than it answered. In the meantime a sepa-
rate issue had arisen as to whether even the participants' direct expenses (i.e., travel, room and
board) could be reimbursed out of the federal portion of the resource pool without being con-
sidered 'intervenor funding' (which would then subject individual members to restrictions on
their future freedom to represent their own organizations in the NCP rulemaking for fear of
'conflict of interest'). At this point the subcommittee decided to try a different tack and draft a
letter to EPA Deputy Administrator Aim requesting that the agency itself act quickly to
resolve the compensation and related conflict of interest issues. It also subsequently decided to
'borrow' funds from the private side of the resource pool to cover members' out-of-pocket
expenses until the needed EPA guidance on appropriate use of federal funds was forthcoming.
In fact EPA never did resolve these important procedural questions or provide the NCP
negotiating team any final guidance as to how they should be handled. After the July 26
subcommittee meeting no further mention is made of compensation or intervenor funding in
the Harvard documentation of the NCP regulatory negotiation. In the end everyone, including
NRDC, simply allowed these issues to go away. Still unanswered, however, is David
Doniger's contention that the long term feasibility of participation by non-profit organizations
in regulatory negotiations will be severely limited without some form of per diem
compensation.
Wilson, Report on Regulatory Negotiation § III, at 5-6 (draft of September 24, 1985) (prepared for
National Science Foundation).
126. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 155-56.
127. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 156-58.
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Agency asked the participants to draft the actual language and the pream-
ble of the proposed rule. EPA was also careful not to promise more than
it could deliver. The final drafts had to go through the normal review and
comment process, so EPA could not promise that the negotiated drafts
would be the rules that were actually promulgated. As it turned out, the
relatively few comments received did not require EPA to alter the lan-
guage of the draft rules at all. Had the comments been more extensive,
EPA was prepared to meet again, informally, with the members of the
committees to discuss the changes that it was intending to make."2 8
Because such a meeting was promised, the participants felt that their
efforts to negotiate a written draft of the proposed rule would not be
ignored.
To avoid any potential misunderstanding about the consensus docu-
ment, EPA and the facilitators attempted to make certain that everyone
knew what they were doing when they signed the final drafts of the pro-
posed rules. They were committing themselves in the first demonstration
and their organizations in the second demonstration. In both cases they
were agreeing to support the draft during the review and comment period
and, if it were not changed, after that as well. By making the written
document the focus of the negotiations, EPA was able to focus all the
energies of the participants on a shared task.
Finally, use of a skilled facilitator proved essential to the success of the
project. EPA made a decision to rely on a non-partisan convenor to
explain the negotiated approach to rulemaking to potentially interested
stakeholders. As the sponsoring entity, EPA knew its motives were likely
to be suspect. The active mapping of stakeholders and the solicitation of
their involvement was crucial to ensuring adequate representation of all
interests.
The skilled facilitators involved in the two demonstrations managed the
actual negotiation processes. The Agency knew it was not in a good posi-
tion to referee conflicts among the participants, even when such disputes
threatened to bring the whole process to a halt. EPA used facilitation
teams to ensure that those managing the process had both the facilitation
skills and the substantive knowledge to help the process along. In the first
demonstration, ERM-McGlennon relied on a pair of senior staff mem-
bers. In the second demonstration, the Assistant to EPA's General Coun-
sel worked in tandem with the ERM-McGlennon staff. This ensured that
the lessons of the first demonstration were not lost.
128. Had the comments been more extensive or more critical, it probably would have meant that
a key participant had not been at the bargaining table.
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The facilitators took the lead in generating agreement on a detailed
agenda and work schedule, organizing a subcommittee meeting at which
components of the final version of the rule were drafted, and convening
the full group to review subcommittee drafts. The facilitators took
responsibility for the preparation of detailed minutes of all meetings and
the complete draft of the final rule. The degree of facilitator involvement,
however, varied in the two demonstrations. The ERM-McGlennon staff,
having a great deal of mediation experience, tended to be more active than
the EPA facilitator. They maintained frequent contact with all partici-
pants, intervened quite actively during several of the meetings, and tended
to initiate a variety of activities, including caucuses during and outside of
meetings.129
The facilitators task was not over once the draft agreements had been
prepared. ERM-McGlennon played a central role during the first demon-
stration in ensuring that the parties checked back with their constituents
and that needed changes were agreed upon by the entire committee.
Indeed, the facilitation team may be central to the entire post-negotiation
phase of the negotiated rulemaking process. The participants may desig-
nate the facilitator, as a non-partisan outsider aware of their intentions, to
be the person to monitor the draft rule as it proceeds through the final
steps of promulgation. The facilitators played such a role in both EPA
demonstrations.
In interviews after the demonstrations were completed, the participants
in both negotiated rulemaking efforts indicated that they had become
advocates of further demonstrations.'8 0 Indeed, several urged EPA to pro-
ceed with further demonstrations (which, at this writing, the agency has
done). 81 The participants felt that the openness of meetings; the
availability of minutes and written subcommittee reports, as well as drafts
of the final agreement; and the presence of all the relevant stakeholders at
the table ensured the legitimacy of the negotiated agreement. While it is
too soon to make a final judgment and there are too few data available to
calculate formally the cost-effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking, the two
demonstrations suggest that in a cooperative setting the pooling of views,
experience, and knowledge can produce a rule that is considered by those
129. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 126, 171-75; L. Susskind & D. Kronenberg,
supra note 30, at 147.
130. L. Susskind & G. McMahon, supra note 30, at 129-148.
131. EPA has recently begun a third demonstration, involving the development of a rule on
migrant farmer working conditions. Notice of Intent to Form an Advisory Committee, 50 Fed. Reg.
38,030 (1985).
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directly involved to be more legitimate than what the Agency might other-
wise have drafted on its own.1"'
In light of this clearly superior outcome of negotiated rules, the courts
should be urged to evaluate the regulatory negotiation process in a more
favorable light. Within the conventional rulemaking process, courts have
undertaken an oversight role designed to induce agencies to conduct better
research, pay attention to the concerns of those with a stake in the rule
and exhibit analytical rigor in promulgating a final rule.'3" The so-called
"hard look" doctrine, adopted by the courts during the last decade, is
intended to make sure that agencies provide a reasonable analytical justifi-
cation for rules.
The products of negotiated rulemaking do not warrant the usual "hard
look". The rationale behind the hard look doctrine will be satisfied during
the negotiations themselves if the following key conditions are adhered to:
1) adequate notice; 2) availability of financial resources to disadvantaged
groups to help them participate on an equal footing; 3) the keeping of a
reasonable record of formal meetings; 4) ample opportunity for all parties
to review the final draft; 5) an opportunity for all parties to discuss the
results of the review and comment process; 6) a chance for all interested
parties to shape the scope of the negotiation agenda, agree on the selection
of a facilitator, and receive access to the information they request; 7) a
clear explanation by the agency of its obligation to the negotiating com-
mittee; and 8) an opportunity for all parties to sign off on a final version
of the agreement. If these elements are incorporated in the negotiations
process, the participants themselves will ensure that the Agency addresses
their concerns, conducts adequate research, and carefully analyzes all pro-
posals in choosing the best one. Thus, the judicial hard look doctrine
would be redundant.
In short, a different standard of judicial review would help to ensure
the efficiency and perceived legitimacy of the rulemaking process. Courts
should insist on substantial reasons for granting judicial review of a rule
that meets the eight conditions listed above. If information was falsified or
the agency failed to promulgate the rule as negotiated, judicial review
would certainly be justified. However, if a party were offered a chance to
participate in a full-fledged negotiated rulemaking effort, but chose to
remain aloof, the courts ought to respond skeptically to a request for
132. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49 for discussion of the characteristics of a legitimate
rule.
133. Harter, Consensual Rules, supra note 11, at 471-85. Judicial review, in effect leads to a
second round regulation, which is often produced through a settlement agreement. For a description
and critique of the role of settlement agreements in the informal rulemaking process, see Gaba, Infor-
mal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEo. L.J. 1241, 1241-82 (1985).
Vol. 3: 133, 1985
Negotiated Rulemaking
judicial review. If the courts adopted this posture, the incentive to partici-
pate in negotiated rulemakings would be enhanced. This would, in turn,
increase the odds of a workable consensus being reached and reduce the
likelihood of legal challenges to subsequent rules. Of course, challenges to
rules based on claims that fundamental rights have been abridged would
still be heard as always.
Judge Patricia Wald of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
has suggested that the judicial role in reviewing negotiated regulations
should not, and will not, be passive."3 4 This is certainly a reasonable posi-
tion, but once an active review has determined that the eight conditions
suggested above have been met, the courts should realize that continued
second-guessing of the results of negotiated rulemakings will undermine
the prospects for using this particular regulatory reform to enhance the
efficiency of the rulemaking process and to restore a measure of legitimacy
to the outcomes of the process.
134. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 17-25 (1984).

